[service-announce] October 20 Gerrit Outage Update

Mohammed Naser mnaser at vexxhost.com
Thu Oct 22 14:36:11 UTC 2020

On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 2:53 AM Ian Wienand <iwienand at redhat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 10:50:42PM -0400, Mohammed Naser wrote:
> > - There is no need for us to have anyone with admin powers to Gerrit
> > at all times,
> Totally agree; I mentioned in the remediation we should look at the
> way we handle Gerrit administrators.  I would say it's mostly a
> convenience for adding initial members to groups, and the occasional
> case where we need to force-merge something.
> I think we should discuss as part of the upcoming PTG
> > - If the above is not possible, anyone who is part of this group
> > should have 2FA enabled inside Launchpad's SSO.
> I agree with this too.  It's not that obvious how to enable this, but
> it can be done via [2].  I would probably just recommend everyone does
> it.
> We know longer term we want to move away from Launchpad only as well.
> > Thank you for this.  I'd also like to raise the question of moving
> > forward, how to be able to track these things.  We had a user that
> > had full root access to our Gerrit installation for ~2 weeks without
> > our knowledge entirely, only uncovered when they did something
> > (that, in the grand scheme of things, was relatively trivial,
> > compared to what could have happened).
> Yeah, not to go into great detail but this wasn't able to be
> "upgraded" to either the on-disk repos or, importantly, the logs.  And
> it's not just luck that ensures such separation :)
> The major (potential for) escalation here happened because our version
> of gerrit keeps plain-text HTTP API keys.  So both an example of
> defence-in-depth success and failure all at once.  We are well on the
> way to replacing that, so we are not sweeping that one under the rug.
> There's a few other thoughts I have, but TBH I'm hesitant to start
> broadcasting them in public mails.  I am of course for transparency
> and participation -- I mean the entire infra is driven by completely
> public git-ops CI and CD; can anyone else say that?!
> What we don't have is a formalised way for security discussions.  I
> think we should
> a) more clearly describe how to responsibly communicate infra security
>    issues; I don't think we have anything like that documented.
> b) start a closed list where we can have free-form discussions about
>    security issues.  I think we have a track record of transparency
>    that would ensure that doesn't turn into a "star chamber" and
>    anyone who was interested with a modicum of trust from the project
>    could join (e.g. our cloud providers and others who are clearly
>    invested in the system).

+100 this.  I am 100% for transparency but I do think there are
things that need to be better discussed in private, IMHO.

>    This could also be part of the responsible disclosure, which would
>    be helpful so that people don't have to sign up for full accounts
>    to post storyboard issues, etc. to alert us to issues.
> -i
> [1] https://etherpad.opendev.org/p/opendev-ptg-planning-oct-2020
> [2] https://help.ubuntu.com/community/SSO/FAQs/2FA

Mohammed Naser

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